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TAX TREATMENT OF SECTION 16(b) REPAYMENTS:
TAx COURT AGAIN REVERSED
Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449
(2d Cir. 1974)
Taxpayer, a director of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (MGM), sold
3400 shares of MGM stock. Profit from the sale was reported in 1961
as long term capital gain. Within six months he purchased 3000 MGM
shares at a lower price." When notified of his potential liability under
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 which prohibits
"short-swing" trading by corporate insiders and makes "profits" on such
trading recoverable by the corporation,3 taxpayer remitted the sale
1. Taxpayer was a successful food corporation executive, member of the boards
of a number of corporations, and investor. MGM approached him to interest him in
a directorship and the purchase of a large number of shares. Taxpayer accepted and
became very active in the corporate business. On April 17, 1961, taxpayer sold some
of his MGM shares, and within six months purchased a like amount at a lower price.
Although he believed the potential liability under § 16(b) to be the result of inad-
vertence, taxpayer immediately paid the appropriate amount, $53,807.86, to MGM both
to avoid delaying the issuance of an MGM proxy statement which would have had to
reveal the potential § 16(b) liability, and to avoid damaging his business reputation.
Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C. 91, 92-93 (1973).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by . . . [a ten percent] beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such is-
suer (other than exempted security) within any period of less than six months,
unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt pre-
viously contracted, shall inure and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in enter-ing into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not purchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months ....
See generally 2 L. Loss, SEcurriEs REGULATION 1037-1132 (2d ed. 1961); Cook & Feld-
man, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HAIv. L. Rnv. 385 (1953);
Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1939); Note, Section 16(b) Insider
Trading, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 872; 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 213, 214-15.
3. "Short-swing" trading is the purchase and sale or sale and purchase of a secu-
rity within a period of less than six months. See Note, supra note 2, at 883-84; cf. Park
& Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987-88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761(1947). An "insider" is an officer, director, or ten percent beneficial owner. See 2 L.
Loss, supra note 2, at 1037; Note, supra note 2, at 879-83. "Profit" under § 16(b) may
result from the investor's improved economic position after selling at a high price and
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1975:824] SECTION 16(b)
price-purchase price difference to MGM. Taxpayer deducted the
payment on his 1962 return as an ordinary and necessary business
expense,4 a deduction against ordinary income. The Commissioner
treated the payment as a long term capital loss5 and assessed a deficien-
cy. The Tax Court held' that the taxpayer had properly characterized
the payment as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 7 The
later purchasing at a low price. The investor, while not truly realizing a profit, avoids
a loss. The amount of this "profit" is the difference between the sale price and purchase
price. For example, if T sold 100 shares of X corporation for $1000 and within six
months purchased 100 shares for $600, his "profit" under § 16(b) would be $400. This
amount would be recoverable by the corporation. See 2 L Loss, supra note 2, at 1062-
63; Note, supra note 2, at 890-92.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a de-
duction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business . . . ." See generally 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 25.01-.137 (rev. ed. 1972).
The taxpayer's status as a director and his right to a deduction in that capacity for
ordinary and necessary business expenses was not at issue. Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C.
91, 95 (1973); 4A J. MERTENS, supra, at § 25.08. See note 25 infra.
5. Long term capital loss means loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than six months. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(4). Long term capi-
tal loss is netted against long term capital gain to arrive at net long term capital gain
or loss within a given tax year. Id. §§ 1222(7), (8). If a taxpayer has a net long
term capital gain that exceeds his net short term capital loss, if any, then 50 percent
of the excess is deducted from the taxpayer's gross income. Id. § 1202. The effect of
these provisions has been concisely summarized: "[Tlwo dollars of net long-term capi-
tal loss is required to offset one dollar of ordinary income." 3B J. MERTENS, supra note
4, at § 22.06.
6. Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C. 91, af'd on rehearing, 61 T.C. 1 (1973). The
rehearing was granted to review the decision in light of Anderson v. Commissioner, 480
F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971), a case with virtually identical
facts. Since venue for appeal in Nathan Cummings was in the Second Circuit, the Tax
Court was not required to follow the result of the Seventh Circuit in Anderson. 61 T.C.
at 2, citing Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
7. 61 T.C. at 3; 60 T.C. at 95. Evidence that taxpayer made the payment to
protect his business reputation consisted of the taxpayer's statements to that effect, and
his payment the day after notification of potential liability, which precluded the possibil-
ity he had received legal advice. 60 T.C. at 94-95. In Anderson the taxpayer stated
that the payments were made to avoid jeopardizing his position with the corporation and
damaging his business reputation. The Tax Court found these beliefs to be "reason-
able." 56 T.C. at 1372-74. The Tax Court made a similar finding in William L.
Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170, 176 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 909 (1971). In Cummings the Tax Court also found that the taxpayer made
the payment to avoid delay in the issuance of an MGM proxy statement. 61 T.C. at
3; 60 T.C. at 95. Proxy statements must include information about "short-swing" profits
by insiders if such amounts are uncollected by the corporation. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
101, Item 7(e), Instruction 4 (1975); cf. 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 278, 280 (1972).
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held: A payment
made in satisfaction of potential liability under section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is properly treated as a long term
capital loss.8
Characterizing an expenditure for federal income tax purposes may
involve looking to a prior transaction to which the expenditure is
related.9 In the leading case of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner,0 the
8. Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 913 (1975). The court in dicta raised another argument. The court stated that
the policy of § 16(b) supported long term capital loss treatment for § 16(b) payments,
since the section was intended to squeeze all possible profits from stock transactions
within its purview. Id. at 452; see L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1063. This purpose must
not be frustrated. Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1973),
citing United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); L. Loss, supra, at 1085. See Note, Tax Treat-
ment of 16(b) Payments, 27 ST.r. L. Rav. 143 (1974), and 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 917 (1973)
for the argument that public policy alone supported the result reached by court of ap-
peals in Anderson.
In early cases the Tax Court denied all loss treatment to § 16(b) payments to avoid
frustration of public policy. Robert Lehman, 25 T.C. 629 (1955); William F. Davis,
Jr., 17 T.C. 549 (1951), appeal dismissed, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1406 (9th Cir. 1953).
The Tax Court later held that the policy of the 1934 Act was not frustrated by allowing
a § 162(a) deduction for § 16(b) payments. Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956);
Charles I. Brown, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1300 (1973). See Rev. Rul. 115, 1961-1
CuM. BuLL. 46; cf. 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 279, 289 (1972).
The basis for this change was apparently the fact pattern in Marks, in which a highly
reputable businessman made a § 16(b) payment even though the potential violation was
very likely inadvertant. See Joseph P. Pike, 44 T.C. 787 (1965); Note, Tax Treatment
of Payments for Apparent Violations of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 36 A.BANY L. Rav. 736 (1972). Inadvertance is not relevant in § 16(b) cases.
See note 46 infra.
9. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969); Arrowsmith v. Commis-
sioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952); see Rees Blow Pipe Mfg. Co., 41 T.C. 598 (1964), afj'd
per curiam, 342 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1965) (amount paid by seller in satisfaction of judg-
ment for misrepresentation in the sale of a building held capital loss); Estate of James
M. Shannonhouse, 21 T.C. 422 (1953) (amounts paid by seller of realty to purchaser
in discharge of liabilities for breach of covenant of title held capital loss).
Receipts may also be classified by looking to prior transactions. See Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1952) (income on sale of worthless notes
held ordinary income); Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948) (income
from contracts following distribution to shareholder held capital gain); Stephen H.
Dorsey, 49 T.C. 606 (1968) (income from participating certificates following liquidation
distribution to shareholder held capital gain); Alvin B. Lowe, 44 T.C. 363 (1965)
(down-payment retained after default held capital gain); cf. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1001 (adjusted basis of property used to determine gain thereon); id., § 1016 (adjust-
ments to basis); id., § 1341 (tax computation for loss of unrestricted right on an item
previously included in gross income).
10. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
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transferees of the assets of a liquidated corporation satisfied a judgment
against the corporation.1 The individuals deducted the amount of the
judgment as an ordinary loss.' 2 The Supreme Court held that, since the
taxpayers' liability for the judgment was based on their status as trans-
ferees, it was necessary to look back to the transfer in order to character-
ize the payment. Because the earlier transfer resulted in capital gain, 3
the payment was treated as a capital loss.' 4
In United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 5 the Supreme Court expanded the
Arrowsmith rule to "forbid an unfair tax windfall" to the taxpayer.' 6
The company had overcharged customers. In a later year, the company
refunded the amounts overcharged 7 and deducted the total repayment
from ordinary income.' Since the income resulting from the over-
charge had been reduced by the 27/2 percent depletion allowance
before payment of income taxes,'9 the full deduction of the refund
11. Transferees are liable for judgments against a corporation following liquidation
and distribution of corporate assets. Phillip-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233, 235-
36 (1937).
12. 344 U.S. at 7. A corporation may deduct as a business expense the amount
of a judgment for which it is liable. See, e.g., Caldwell & Co. v. Commissioner, 234
F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956); Mulgrew Blacktop, Inc. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 570
(S.D. Iowa 1969).
In Arrowsmith, the corporation would have deducted the judgment from ordinary in-
come had the judgment been rendered before liquidation and transfer of assets. Taxpay-
ers argued that the same procedure, i.e. deduction from ordinary income, should apply
following liquidation. The Court reasoned, however, that the liquidation changed the
procedure. That is, had the judgment occurred in the year of the liquidation, corporate
income and corporate assets would have been reduced by the amount of the judgment.
The amount of the taxpayers' long term capital gains upon liquidation would, therefore,
have been diminished. Thus the postliquidation judgment payment should be character-
ized as a long term capital loss.
13. 344 U.S. at 7. For federal income tax purposes the final liquidation and distri-
bution of corporate assets is treated as the sale or exchange of a capital asset. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331(a).
14. 344 U.S. at 8.
15. 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
16. Id. at 685.
17. The refunds were required by a decision of the Supreme Court reversing a state
corporation commission rate order. Michigan Wis. Pipe Line Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 355 U.S. 425 (1958).
18. There was a question whether to apply the business expense deduction or the
business loss deduction. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 162, 165. It was unneces-
sary to decide the issue since the Commissioner has always allowed one of the two. See
394 U.S. at 683 n.3.
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613 allows taxpayers to deduct a fixed percentage
of certain receipts to compensate for the depletion of natural resources from which they
derive income.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/9
828 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:824
resulted in the "equivalent of a double deduction." 20  The Court disal-
lowed 271 percent of the deduction,2 restating the Arrowsmith rule:
If income was taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer
would be accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were fully
deductible from ordinary income.22
In William L. Mitchell23 and James E. Anderson,24 the Tax Court
found the Arrowsmith rule inapplicable to section 16(b) payments.
Reasoning that the payments were made to protect the insiders' business
reputations and were therefore "ordinary and necessary expenses" of
doing business,25 the Tax Court allowed the ordinary business expense
20. 394 U.S. at 684. When the revenues were received, 27/ percent of the over-
charge was deducted pursuant to the depletion allowance. The "practical equivalent of
a double deduction" resulted when 100 percent of each refund dollar, each equal to one
dollar of overcharge, was also deducted as a loss in a later year, equalling an overall
deduction of $1.275 for each dollar of refund. Id.
21. The parties in Skelly Oil stipulated that if the full deduction claimed by the
company was disallowed, the proper deduction should equal the full deduction minus
"the percentage depletion allowance. . . claimed.. . in the years of receipt. .... "
22. 394 U.S. at 685. Although similar to the tax benefit doctrine under INT. RnV.
CODE OF 1954, § 111, which accords beneficial tax treatment to recovery of bad debts,
prior taxes, and delinquent amounts, the Arrowsmith rule usually is applied to situations
in which payments are made after receipt of income, rather than cases in which income
is received after payment. See Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restora-
tions, and Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. Rnv. 995
(1968). The leading case explaining the application of § 111 is Alice Phelan Sullivan
Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967), noted in 66 MICH. L. REv. 381
(1967).
The Skelly Oil approach has been criticized as not following the Arrowsmith rule. In
Arrowsmith the Court looked to the tax character of the first of two integrally related
transactions to determine the character of the second. In Skelly Oil the Court looked
to the end result-avoidance of a double deduction. See Casey, Aftermath of Skelly,
20 TuL. TAx INsr. 400, 416-17 (1971); McLane, Supreme Court Raises More Questions
Than It Answers in Skelly Oil Decision, 31 J. TAX. 66 (1969); Rabinovitz, Effect of
Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences of Current Receipts or
Payments, 28 TAx L. Rnv. 85 (1972). Cf. Pacific Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 483
F.2d 209, 215 (9th Cir. 1973).
23. 52 T.C. 170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
909 (1971).
24. 56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973).
25. It is well settled that expenses incurred to protect the taxpayer's business reputa-
tion are "ordinary and necessary expenses." William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170 (1969);
rev'd on other grounds, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971)
(taxpayer was a corporate officer); Joseph P. Pike, 44 T.C. 787 (1965) (stockholder);
Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956) (director); Paul Draper, 26 T.C. 201 (1956)
(entertainer); William L. Butler, 17 T.C. 675 (1951) (consultant, officer, director); but
cf. P. Walter Graham, 40 T.C. 14 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 878 (4th
Cir. 1964) (being solely a director not part of trade or business). The taxpayer's belief
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deductions and distinguished Arrowsmith on two grounds. The court
reasoned that for Arrowsmith to apply, the amount of the payment must
be "integrally related" to the amount of the gain on the earlier sale of
stock, a relationship lacking in these cases.2 6 Additionally, the Tax
Court reasoned that in section 16(b) cases the taxpayer acts in two
capacities, as a shareholder when selling stock and as an insider when
making the section 16(b) payment, while in Arrowsmith the taxpayers
were at all times acting in one capacity.27
On appeal, however, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits disallowed the
ordinary deductions, and held that when the taxpayer made a section
16(b) payment the Arrowsmith rule applied, rather than the deduction
for ordinary and necessary business expense. 28 The courts reasoned
that the payments had to be treated as long term capital losses because
the earlier sales of stock were capital transactions. The sufficient
relationship between the section 16(b) payments and earlier sales of
stock was provided by section 16(b);2a the taxpayer acted at all times in
the capacity of an insider.30
In Nathan Cummings,31 the section 16(b) issue arose for the third
time. Noting that "venue for appeal in this case is in the Second
that injury to his reputation will result must be reasonable. William L. Mitchell, supra;
Joseph P. Pike, supra; Old Town Corp., 37 T.C. 845 (1962); Laurence M. Marks, supra.
26. 56 T.C. at 1374-75; 52 T.C. at 174. In Mitchell the Tax Court held:
... there is no relationship between the amount of the capital gain realized
upon the sale transaction ... and the amount which "inures" to the stock is-
suer under section 16(b).
52 T.C. at 174. The circuit courts reached the opposite result by focusing on the rela-
tionship between the transactions that § 16(b) created. See text accompanying note 29
infra.
27. 56 T.C. at 1375-76; 52 T.C. at 175. The Tax Court in Cummings relied on
United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972), which held that when a party might have
acted in one of two capacities, it is necessary to decide in what capacity he acted to
determine the nature of the deduction. The Tax Court viewed Cummings as a share-
holder when he sold the stock and as a director when making the payment. 61 T.C.
at 4. If, however, § 16(b) is recognized in order to apply the Arrowsmith rule, then
the taxpayer's status as a statutory insider ought to control the Generes choice. The
Seventh Circuit saw no need for identical capacities in the two transactions in any event.
Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1973).
28. Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 56 T.C. 1370
(1971); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
909 (1971), rev'g 52 T.C. 170 (1969).
29. 480 F.2d at 1307; 428 F.2d at 263-64. See notes 38 & 40 infra and accompany-
ing text.
30. 480 F.2d at 1308; 428 F.2d at 263.
31. 60 T.C. 91, aff'd on rehearing, 61 T.C. I (1973).
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Circuit,"' 2 the Tax Court again rejected the circuit court decisions,
reiterated its earlier reasoning, and added an argument distinguishing
Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil. In those cases, the Tax Court reasoned, the
result reached by the Supreme Court was identical to the result that
would have been reached under the Internal Revenue Code had the
payment and the earlier transaction occurred in the same tax year.88
Since the Tax Court believed that a section 16(b) payment made in the
same tax year as the sale of stock would not be related to the earlier
capital transaction under the Code,84 the court again refused to find the
necessary "integral relationship."38
On appeal, 8 the Second Circuit followed the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits17 and found that section 16(b) sufficiently related the payment
to the earlier sale of stock for the Arrowsmith rule to apply.88 The
payment "had its genesis" in the earlier sale; the sale price of the stock
was a factor in determining the amount of the payment; and if a
deduction against ordinary income were allowed, the taxpayer would
realize a tax windfall similar to that disallowed in Skelly Oil."° The
32. 61 T.C. at 2 (footnote omitted).
33. In the Arrowsmith situation the liquidation would have been treated as if it had
occurred on the last day of the tax year. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331. The judg-
ment payment, if made in the same tax year, would have reduced the assets of the corpo-
ration before that date. Therefore, the transfer to the taxpayers would have been less the
amount of the judgment, in effect reducing the taxpayers' capital gains.
In. Skelly Oil, the case was simpler. If the corporation had refunded overcharges in
the same tax year, it simply would have subtracted the amount of the refunds from the
total income earned in the tax year, prior to applying the 27 percent depletion allow-
ance. INT. RIv. CODE OF 1954, § 613.
34. Under the income tax statute alone the § 16(b) payment would not be related
to gain or loss on the stock transaction. The long term capital gain on the sale of stock
would be charged against the long term capital losses for the year, if any. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 1201. The two transactions would not be combined in any manner.
35. 61 T.C. at 3.
36. Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 913 (1975).
37. See cases cited note 28 supra and accompanying text.
38. The majority in Cummings v. Commissioner characterized the case as involving
"[tihe interplay of two distinct statutory schemes .... ." 506 F.2d at 449. The Tax
Court ignored the provisions of § 16(b) and confined its analysis to tax law. See 61
T.C. at 3. Because the § 16(b) payment to MGM and the earlier sale of stock were
not related by tax law, the Tax Court found Arrowsmith inapplicable. The approach
is internally coherent, if the premise that no other statutory scheme should have tax con-
sequences is accepted. The premise, however, was rejected by the courts of appeals.
See notes 40-46 infra and accompanying text.
39. 506 F.2d at 451, quoting Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259, 261 (6th
Cir. 1970).
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court characterized the payment as a surrender of a portion of the
proceeds on the sale of stock,40 and reasoned that, since the sale resulted
in long term capital gain, the surrender should be treated as long term
capital loss.4
40. 506 F.2d at 451. The existence of a sufficient relationship between the § 16
(b) payment and the earlier sale of stock does not require a tracing of proceeds from
one transaction to the other; however, such a relationship is supported in three ways.
First, the sale is the sine qua non for the payment. Second, the sale price is one factor
in the equation for determining "profit" under § 16(b). See note 3 supra. Finally,
since the economic advantage to the taxpayer is derived from a sale of shares at a high
price and purchase of the same shares at a lower price, the payment may fairly be
viewed as a return of the difference-the § 16(b) "profit." See id.
Of course, variations in the taxpayer's tax situation from year to year will affect the
degree to which treatment of the payment as a capital loss will be equivalent to treat-
ment of the gain on the sale of stock as a capital gain. See Note, Tax Treatment of
Section 16(b) Payments, 27 STAN. L Rnv. 143, 151-2, 155 (1974). These variations
will occur, however, whenever an adjustment is made in one year for an event of an
earlier year. United States v. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. 678, 692 n.1 (1969); cf. Nelson, Tax
Deductibility of Insider Profit Repayments: Resolving Apparent Conflict, 24 CAsE W.
REs. L. REv. 330 (1973) (suggests a complicated tax adjustment to reflect the "economic
reality" of the taxpayer's situation); Rabinovitz, supra note 22, at 112.
41. 506 F.2d at 449. Judge Drennen, dissenting in Nathan Cummings, recom-
mended that the amount of the § 16(b) payment be added to the basis of the purchased
stock. 61 T.C. at 5. The concurring opinion in Cummings v. Commissioner agreed.
506 F.2d at 454. This approach combines the refusal of the Tax Court to recognize
the effect of § 16(b) on the tax law and the courts of appeals' unwillingness to allow
a full deduction:
The amount of income on the sale... has no bearing on the calculation of
the insider's profit ....
m . . [he transaction resulting in capital gain terminated with the sale, and
the purchase was the initiation of a new transaction that should be considered
entirely separate and independent for tax purposes ....
[ . . There is no . . . reason why [the Internal Revenue Code of 1954]
must be construed in pari materia with the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act
[sic].
Id. Clearly the concurring opinion would require the § 16(b) violation to have income
tax significance of its own, a view similar to the position adopted by the Tax Court.
See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text. Several commentators have argued for
such treatment. E.g., Englebrecht, The Arrowsmith Doctrine: A Review and Analysis,
52 TAxEs 686 (1974); Lokken, Tax Significance of Payments in Satisfaction of Liabilities
Arising Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 GA. L. REv. 298
(1970); 28 Sw. L.J. 625 (1974); 5 Tx TEcm L. REv. 872 (1974). See also Nelson,
supra note 40.
Although a sale followed by a purchase of stock, as in Cummings, has no tax signifi-
cance, a purchase followed by a sale within six months, also a violation of § 16(b),
will result in capital gain or loss, with resulting tax significance. 506 F.2d at 454. In
such a situation the concurring opinion and the Tax Court may be more willing to relate
the § 16(b) payment to the earlier transaction. Id.
Addition of the amount of the 16(b) payment to the basis of the stock in a sale-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/9
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The court in Cummings v. Commissioner correctly applied the Ar-
rowsmith rule in finding that the surrender under section 16(b) was
"sufficiently related" to the earlier sale of stock. While the Tax Court
required this relationship to be established by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954,42 the Second Circuit permitted the relationship to be
established by section 16(b).43 Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil support the
latter view. In Arrowsmith the payment was made to satisfy a judg-
ment based on corporate law.44 In Skelly Oil the payment was made to
satisfy a judgment in a rate case. 45 Similarly, Cummings v. Commis-
sioner involved a payment made to satisfy a potential liability based on
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.46 In each case, the relationship
between the payment and the earlier capital transaction was created by
law other than the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
This pattern of cases vitiates the arguments presented by the Tax
Court. First, the Court in Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil focused not on
the relationship between the amounts of the payment and the earlier
capital transaction, but rather on the relationship between the two
transactions.47 Second, the Tax Court's argument that in Arrowsmith
the taxpayers acted in one capacity, as transferees, and that in Cum-
purchase sequence, as suggested by the concurring opinion, is not consistent with Arrow-
smith, which required immediate tax consequences for a payment related to an earlier
transaction. See text accompanying notes 42-46 infra. Neither party, however, urged
adoption of this approach. Nathan Cummings, 61 T.C. 1, 5 (1973).
42. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. The Tax Court requirement was sup-
ported in Note, Tax Treatment of Payments For Apparent Violations of Section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 ALBANY L. Ruv. 736 (1972).
43. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text.
45. 394 U.S. at 679, citing Michigan Wis. Pipe Line Co. v. Corporation Comm'n,
355 U.S. 425 (1958).
46. The majority in Cummings v. Commissioner treated the payment as if it were
mandated by a judgment despite the lack of adjudication. Their reasoning is sound.
Section 16(b) consists of simple elements (a purchase and sale or sale and purchase
within six months by a statutory insider). It imposes strict liability-no proof of intent
is necessary. Note, Section 16(b): Insider Trading, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 872. Finally,
the taxpayer's defenses to the § 16(b) violation were "frivolous." 506 F.2d at 452.
There is no indication in either Arrowsmith or Skelly Oil that, had the taxpayer in those
cases settled in advance of adjudication, the result would have been different.
47. See Casey, supra note 22, at 410. In Arrowsmith, the Court emphasized the
relationship between the payment of a judgment and the earlier transfer of assets to tax-
payers; the amount of the judgment against the corporation was related to an earlier vio-
lation of fiduciary duty, not the amount transferred. 344 U.S. at 8-9. In Skelly Oil,
the Court emphasized the relationship between the corporation's refunds and earlier
overcharges for natural gas. 394 U.S. at 684-85.
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1975:824]
mings v. Commissioner the taxpayer acted in two capacities, as share-
holder when selling stock and as insider when making the section 16(b)
payment, completely ignores the impact of section 16(b) itself. 48 Sec-
tion 16(b) makes "short-swing" trading by "insiders" unlawful. That
an "insider" may also be described as a "shareholder" is of no conse-
quence. Finally, the Tax Court's argument that the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 would not have related the payment to the earlier sale of
stock if both had occurred in the same tax year disregards the effect of
permitting section 16(b) to relate sufficiently the payment to the earlier
sale under Arrowsmith. There is nothing in Arrowsmith to suggest
that, once the sufficient relationship is established, a timing factor must
be considered.
By holding that a payment by a director of a corporation for a
potential section 16(b) violation must be treated as a long term capital
loss rather than an ordinary deduction, the Second Circuit reversed the
Tax Court for the third time. There was no indication in Nathan
Cummings that the Tax Court will abandon its position49 and no
indication in Cummings v. Commissioner that the courts of appeals will
abandon their position. Therefore, the Commissioner will assess defi-
ciencies in the remaining circuits whenever taxpayers attempt to treat
section 16(b) payments as ordinary deductions rather than long term
capital losses.
48. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
49. The Tax Court has permitted an ordinary deduction in a similar case. See
Charles I. Brown, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1300 (1973).
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